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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE CASE
©lis is an appeal before the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to the
jurisdiction conferred on the Court by Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(j) (1953 as
amended).

The Division of Real Estate seeks judicial review of a decision of

the Fifth Judicial District Court for Washington County, oixiering payment from
the Real Estate Recovery Fund of $5f750 per person involved in a single real
estate transaction for a total recovery of $23,000, in contravention of Utah
Code Ann. § 61-2a-5(l) which limits recovery to $10,000 per single
transaction.

DISPOSITION BEDCW
Respondents obtained a judgment against Steven Carter for $34,026.31.
After unsuccessfully trying to obtain payment frcm Carter, Respondents then
petitioned the District Court for an order directing the Utah Division of Real
Estate of the Department of Business Regulation to pay Respondents out of the
Real Estate Recovery Fund.

The District Court granted Respondents petition in

the amount of $23,000 or $5,750 per person. The Division appealed this
decision to the Utah Supreme Court.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. Whether the District Court incorrectly interpreted the Real
Estate Recovery Fund Act to allcw payment on a "per claiitant" rather than on a
"per transaction" basis?
2. Whether the District Court erred in oixiering payment to the
petitioners on an individual basis, \riien the underlying judgment did not make
a finding of individual damges?

STATUTES DETERMINATIVE OF THIS CASE
The following statutes are determinative of t h i s case, and must
therefore be considered by the Court:

1. Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-2a-l, et seq. (1953 as amended),
known as t h e "Real E s t a t e Recovery Fund Act."
2. Utah Code Ann. §§ 6 8 - 3 - 1 1 , 6 8 - 3 - 1 2 ( 1 ) ( a ) and
68-3-12(2)(1)

(1953 as amended).

Due t o t h e l e n g t h of t h e s e s t a t u t e s , they are
reproduced i n f u l l i n the Appendix.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON REVIEW
Petitioner seeks a reversal of the D i s t r i c t Court's decision allowing
each person t o recover $5,750.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE

This i s an appeal from the order of t h e F i f t h J u d i c i a l
D i s t r i c t Court granting recovery t o t h e p e t i t i o n e r s below i n the
amount of $5750 a p i e c e for a t o t a l of $23,000.
COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
The McBrides obtained a judgment on January 30, 1087 a g a i n s t
Steven R. Carter and SRC Investment Company.

That judgment found

t h a t Carter had committed fraud and m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n a r e a l
e s t a t e t r a n s a c t i o n w i t h t h e McBrides.

On or about May 16, 1988,

t h e McBrides f i l e d a p e t i t i o n i n t h e F i f t h J u d i c i a l

District

Court for Washington County seeking an order d i r e c t i n g payment of
t h e unpaid Carter judgment from the Real E s t a t e Recovery Fund.

A

memorandum was f i l e d with the court by the Utah Attorney
G e n e r a l ' s Office as counsel for the Division of Real E s t a t e on
behalf of the Real E s t a t e Recovery Fund.

The Division admitted

t h a t t h e Recovery Fund was l i a b l e for $10,000 t o the McBrides,
but denied any payment in excess of t h a t was s t a t u t o r i l y
possible.

Oral argument on the case was heard on J u l y 12, 1988.

Judge Eves granted the McBride's p e t i t i o n and ordered t h e
Division of Real E s t a t e t o pay each of the McBrides $5750 from
the Recovery Fund.

Judgment was entered on July 28, 1988 and the

Division of Real E s t a t e f i l e d a Notice of Appeal on August 23,
1988.

The appeal was o r i g i n a l l y f i l e d in the Utah Court of

Appeals, but was t r a n s f e r r e d t o the Utah Supreme Court upon
motion by the Division of Real Estate for j u r i s d i c t i o n a l r e a s o n s .

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about January 30, 1987, respondents, Don W. McBride, Yvonne Z.
McBride, James G. McBride and Paula S. McBride ("McBrides") obtained a final
judgment in the District Court of Washington County, State of Utah ("district
court"), against Steven R. Carter and SRC Investment Company ("Carter") for
the amount of $34,026.31, representing $23,000.00 in actual damages suffered
as a r e s u l t of fraud and misrepresentation oonmitted by Carter, as well as
$5000 in punitive danages, and $6,026.31 in attorney's fees and court costs.
(R. 89, 90) The McBrides, co-investors in property purchased from Carter,
received t h e i r judgment as a group. The court did not mke any finding that
the McBrides were injured individually, and did not assess the damages per
capita.

The court found that Carter, a licensed real estate agent, had

oormitted five fraudulent acts against Respondents. (R. 89, 90)

-
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The McBrides nade searches and inquiries to locate assets of Carter in
order to collect on their judgment, but without success. To date

no amount

has been received or collected leaving the entire judgment of $34,026.31
unpaid. (R. 98)
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §61-2a-5, Respondents petitioned the District
Court for an order directing the Utah Division of Real Estate of the
Department of Business Regulation ("Division") to pay Respondents $29,026.31
out of the Real Estate Recovery Fund ("Recovery Fund" or "Fund").

The amount

requested represented the entire judgment against the original defendants less
$5,000.00 awarded as punitive damages. (R. 98, 99)
Respondents' petition was heard before the District Court of Washington
County, State of Utah, on July 12, 1988. John L. Miles, counsel for the
Respondents, presented oral argument in siipport of the petition.

Counsel for

the Division, Sheila Page, Assistant Attorney General, appeared on behalf of
the Recovery Fund and presented argument opposing payment of more than
$10,000.00 frcm the Recovery Fund in accordance with the limitation found in
Utah Code Ann. §61-2a-5(l). (R. 158) The Division did acknowledge that the
Respondents were entitled to receive $10,000.00 frcm the Recovery Fund. (R.
159)
The District Court, in ruling on the petition, made the following
findings of facts:
a. That Respondents had filed a proper petition and had met all
conditions required fcy law for recovery frcm the Recovery Fund.
b. That Respondents sustained actual danages of $23,000.00 which
were included in the $34,026.31 judgment against Carter.
c. That at all relevant times Carter was a real estate licensee.
d. That none of the above judgment against Carter had been
received or collected.

-
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e. That the applicable statute in this natter should be the
statute in effect at the time Respondents filed their petition for
recovery from the Recovery Fund and not the Recovery Fund statute in
effect at the time the original complaint was filed against the original
defaidants.
f. That the statute in effect when the petition was filed on or
about May 16, 1988 does not allcw for recovery of punitive damges,
attorney fees, interest or court costs and that as a result Respondents
could not recover nore than the $23,000 in actual damages frcm the
Recovery Fund.
g. That Utah Code Ann. §61-2a-5 is not clear in reference to
instances where there are multiple claimants, but the court finds that
each individual who has sustained actual damages nay bring a claim
against the recovery fund with each individual claim being limited to
$10,000.00 for a single transaction.
h. That each of the four individual respondents suffered actual
damages of $5,750.00 (being one-fourth of the $23,000.00 actual damages
included in the original judgment) and that each was entitled to receive
$5,750.00 frcm the Real Estate Recovery Fund, or to claim up to
$10,000.00 each. (R. 159-160)
The District Court thereby directed the Division to pay frcm the Real
Estate Recovery Fund the sum of $5,750.00 to each of the four Respondents for
a total payment of $23,000.00, the amount of uncollected actual daitages
included in the original judgment which remained unpaid. (R. 162)

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Utah Supreme Court has held that it accords considerable deference to
the decisions of the trial courts unless there is a shewing that the court
abused its discretion and misapplied the law.

The trial court in this case

misapplied the provisions of the Recovery Fund Act, Utah Code Ann. § 61-2a-l,
et seq.,

(1953 as amsnded), to the petition filed by the McBrides. The judge

ordered the Recovery Fund to pay the McBrides each $5750, for a total of
$23,000, in contravention of the wording of the statute which limits recovery
to $10,000 per transaction.
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Judge Eves based his decision to award $5750 to each of the four
McBrides on the fact that the Recovery Fund Act refers to those who may bring
a claim against the fund as "persons." Judge Eves does not follow the rule of
construction provided in Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-12(1)(a), which says that the
"singular embraces the plural" and the "plural embraces the singular."
The use of the general term "person" must yield to the more
specific term "per transaction," which is clearly a limitation on recovery
intended by the legislature.
The Utah Supreme Court has said that when the language of a
statute is clear and unambiguous, the courts are required to give it effect.
The wording of § 61-2a-5(l), "No recovery may be more than $10fQ00 for a
single transaction and no more than $50,000

for any one licensee," is clear

and unambiguous. The district court's interpretation requires inferring
language into the statute, such as "not more than $10,000 per person per
transaction."
Should the Court determine that the statute is not clear and
unambiguous, then the legislative intent and purpose must be examined.

The

Court need only look to the intent specified in the statute to harmonize the
language of the statute with the intent and purpose of the act. The Recovery
Fund was enacted to establish a fund to reimburse the public for damges
incurred by defaulting real estate licensees up to $10,000, and to provide
revenue for education and research to improve the real estate profession and
make it more responsible to the public. The Fund was not established to
provide relief to judgment creditors beyond the $10,000 limit, but was
established to provide a measure of relief to as ireny people as possible.
The "per transaction" limit makes more sense than the "per person"
interpretation, due to the fact that a "transaction" is the basis of the
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relationship between claimants and real estate licensees. A transaction is
the buying and selling of one piece of property, and encompasses the many
smaller acts which make up the relationship between the parties. The
McBrides, as a group, purchased one piece of property from Carter, and
whatever harm he did to them, was within the context of that one real estate
transaction.

Regardless of hew neny parties there are to a transaction, it

is clear that the legislature intended to limit recovery in each transaction
to $10,000.
The district court erred when it awarded the McBrides recovery
from the Fund on an individ\ial basis so that they could collect the entire
$23,000 in actual damages. The final judgment, which served as the basis for
the claim against the Recovery Fund, did not make any finding of individual
harm against the McBrides. The McBrides purchased the property as a single
entity, they were injured by Carter's bad acts as an entity, and they took
judgment against Carter as an entity. The trial court should not have reached
back into the underlying judgment and assessed damages to the McBrides on an
individual basis, since there was no evidence in that judgment, or before the
court in this action, that demonstrated that each McBride had been injured
individually and was entitled to 25 percent of the actual danages.
The district court's interpretation of the Recovery Fund Act could
have disastrous consequences. The "$10,000 per transaction" limitation is the
first half of a conjunctive sentence.

If the logic which was applied to the

first half of the sentence is applied to the second half, the result could be
that the Fund is liable for $50,000 "per person" per transaction, or $50,000
per licensee per transaction.

Either of these two possibilities would quickly

bankrupt the fund.
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•The language of the Recovery Fund Act sets specific limits on the
amount of money which can be recovered fran the fund on a "per transaction"
basis.

The use of general terms, such as "person" should not expand recovery

which is limited by specific terminology.

This Court should give effect to

the plain meaning of the statute and the intent of the legislature in setting
a limitation on recovery.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT CX3MMITTED AN ERROR OF LRW WHEN IT INTERPRETED
THE $10,000 PER TRANSACTION LIMITATION IN UTAH CODE ANN, §61-2A-5(1)
TO ALLOW EACH PARTY TO A REAL ESTATE TRANSACTION TO RECOVER UP TO
$10,000 PER PERSON.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that "although the Supreme Court may
review both facts and law, it typically accords considerable deference to the
judgment of the trial court due to its advantaged position and will not
disturb the action of that court unless evidence clearly preponderates to the
contrary, or the trial court abuses its discretion and misapplies principles
of law."

Jeppson v. Jeppson, 684 P.2d 69 (Utah 1984).

See also Hardy v.

Hendrickson, 495 P.2d 28 (Utah 1972); Shaw v. Jeppson, 239 P.2d 745 (Utah
1952; Stanley v. Stanley, 94 P.2d 465 (Utah 1939).

In this case, the lower

court misapplied Utah Code Ann. § 61-2a-5(l) (1953 as amended) by allowing
each party in a single transaction to recover up to $10,000. This application
of § 61-2a-5(l) is contrary to the express language of that statute and
legislative intent.
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A) The District Court's Interpretation Of The Term "Person" Is Contrary
To The Utah Rules Of Construction And Gammon Law.
In ruling on this case, Judge Eves focused on the phrase "A person may
bring a claim against the Real Estate Education, Research, and Recovery
Fund . . . "

Utah Code Ann. § 61-2a-5(l). The court determined the term

"person" was singular and therefore that each person involved in a transaction
could recover up to the $10,000 limit set in the last sentence in that
subsection.

Hcwever, this ruling is contrary to the rules of construction set

forth in Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-12(1) (a) and the ocmmon law.

Section 68-3-

12(1)(a) provides that "the singular number includes the plural, and the
plural the singular." A situation similar to this one occurred in Mprtgage
Bankers Ass'n v. N.J. Real Estate Ccmnission, 491 A.2d 1317 (N.J. Super. A.D.
1985), in which the court was interpreting a provision of the New Jersey Real
Estate Recovery Fund statute which was drawn in terms of "either party," a
phrase implying only two parties to the transaction.

The court looked to

N.J.S.A. 1:1-2, prescribing the rule of construction which stated that the use
of the singular "shall be understood to include and to apply to several
persons or parties as well as to one * * *."

In the present case, the

district court interpreted the term "person" as being singular. Hcwever, the
rules of construction provide that the singular includes the plural and vice
versa.

Therefore, the term "person" should be interpreted to include a group

of people as well as a singular person.
This Court has dealt with the problem of interpreting statutory
language on iteny occasions.

In Hcwe v. Jackson, 421 P.2d 159 (Utah 1966), the

Court addressed the issue of whether a statute which was drafted using the
term "corporation" could be construed to include "persons". The Court held:
. . . [T]here is no reason to believe that there was any intent to
confer a privilege solely upon corporations and thus discriminate
against an individual, a partnership or any other type of entity
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rendering such a service. Just as in most instances, when rights
are conferred upon "persons/' it also includes corporations, the
converse is true: Where it is essential to give a statute a fair,
reasonable and nondiscriminatory application/ the use of the term
"corporation" should be deemed to include "persons." Id. at 161.

Also, Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-11 states that words and phrases are to be
construed according to the context and the approved usage of the language.
When used in context, the phrase "A person nay bring a claim . . ."is merely
generic language allowing a claim to be brought against the Recovery Fund.
The language which follows that phrase is the important part of the statute
and clearly lays out the conditions precedent to filing a claim against the
Recovery Fund.

The critical language outlines the fact that a claimant must

have a "final judgment" from a "court of competent jurisdiction in this state"
and the claimant may file a "verified petition" only after the "termination of
all proceedings including appeals"

This language outlining the procedural

aspects of filing a claim is followed by language which limits the claiitent to
"uncollected actual damages," exclusive of "attorney's fees", ".interest", and
"court costs." Then the statute very clearly and very specifically says, "No
recovery from the fund may be more than $10,000 for a single transaction and
no more than $50,000 for any one licensee."

When read in the context in

which intended, this statute clearly limits recovery from the fund to $10,000
per transaction not per person involved in a transaction.
Further supporting this interpretation is Osuala v. Aetna Life &
Casualty, 608 P. 2d 242 (Utah 1980) which held that specific provisions prevail
over more general expressions when determining the meaning or application of
the provision of an act. As stated above, the term "person" is a general term
used to represent individuals, partnerships, corporations, etc*

In this

statute "person" simply describes the entity with the judgment outlined in
Utah Code Ann. § 61-2a-5(l).

In contrast with the term "person" is the

- i n .

provision "per transaction" used in the phrase limiting recovery, which is
more specific and a term of art. 'Therefore, if there is a conflict of
interpretation, the specific term "per transaction" should prevail over the
more general expression of "any person."

B) A Statute Should Be Applied According To Its Literal Wording And
Provisions Should Be Construed According To Generally Accepted
Meanings,
Utah Code Ann. § 61-2a-5(l) provides that "No recovery frcm the fund may
be more than $10,000 for a single transaction and no more than $50,000 for any
one licensee."

Courts have held that if the meaning of language in a statute

is clear and unambiguous, courts are but required to give it effect.
Min, Co. v. Qnne, 289 P.2d 132 (Utah 1930).

Plutis

Further, in Pfest Jordan v.

Morrison, 656 P.2d 445 (Utah 1982), the court held that a statute should be
applied according to its literal wording unless it is xmreasonably confused or
inoperable.
(1967).

Citing Gord v. Salt Lake City, 20 Utah 2d 138, 434 P.2d 449

This statute's literal wooxiing provides that "No recovery frcm the

fund ray be more than $10,000 for a single transaction."

To interpret the

statute the way the district court has interpreted it would require inferring
additional language, such as
single transaction."

"not more than $10,000 per person involved in a

Hcwever, this statute is specifically worded to provide

that only $10,000 shall be paid "per transaction" not per person involved in a
transaction.
The Court in West Jordan v. Morrison, 656 P.2d at 446, further stated
that "we must assume that each term in the statute was used advisedly ty the
legislature and that each should be interpreted and applied according to its
usually accepted meaning."
1987).

See also H o m e v. Home, 737 P.2d 244 (Utah App.

Generally a "transaction" consists of an act, agreement or several
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acts or agreements between or among parties whereby a cause of action or
alteration of legal rights occur. Miles v. Starks, 590 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1979).

Further, it is a natter of common sense that a transaction may

involve multiple parties.

In this case, the statute clearly states that

recovery frcm the fund shall be not more than $10,000 "per transaction"
indicating that no matter hew many parties are involved in a transaction, they
nay only recover up to $10,000.

C) If A Statute Is Not Clear And Unambiguous, It Should Be Applied
According To Legislative Intent And Purpose.
Should this court determine that the statute is not clear and unambiguous
then the legislative intent and purpose must be examined.

In Osuala v. Aetna

Life & Casualty, 608 P.2d 242 (Utah 1980), the court held that if there is
doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning or application of the provisions of an
act, it is appropriate to analyze the act in its entirety, in light of its
objective, and to harmonize its provisions in accordance with legislative
intent and purpose. The Utah Legislature enacted the Real Estate Recovery
Fund Act for two purposes. First, to establish a fund to reimburse the public
for danages incurred by defaulting real estate licensees up to $10,000, and
secondly to provide revenue for education and research to improve the real
estate profession and make it more responsible to the public.
§ 61-2a-l, et seq. (1953 as amended).

Utah Code Ann.

The Fund is not designed to provide

relief to judgment creditors beyond the $10,000 limit. The purpose of the
Fund is to provide a measure of relief to as many of those injured as
possible, not to make each person injured by a defaulting real estate licensee
whole.
Cases cx^nstruing similar Real Estate Recovery Fund statutes corroborate
this statement of the purpose.

In Doribalian v. Fox, 152 Cal. Rptr. 86 (Cal.
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App. Ct. 1979), the plaintiffs listed property with a real estate agent. The
real estate agent then cheated the plaintiffs by first not exposing the
plaintiffs' property to the market as his professional obligations required
him to do. He then submitted only one bid to the plaintiffs which he
represented as being from a disinterested party when in fact it was his cwn
bid, submitted under a false name. Relying on the real estate agent's
representations that this offer was the best they could do, the plaintiffs
accepted the agent's fraudulent offer for well belcw the fair market value of
the property.

Finally, the agent later forged the plaintiffs' initials on

sane escrcw instructions, enabling the agent to convert $28,731.51 of the
plaintiffs' money to his cwn use. The plaintiffs' claimed that the real
estate agent defrauded them in two separate transactions, hcwever the
California Court of Appeals held that there was only one real estate
transaction because there was only one piece of property listed and sold. The
real estate agent's several fraudulent acts were cormitted within the context
of that single transaction.
In the instant case, there was only one piece of property sold to the
McBrides by Carter. Regardless of the number or nature of fraudulent acts
ccranitted by Carter which injured plaintiffs, all of those acts were within
the context of one real estate transaction. Therefore, only $10,000 may be
recovered for that one real estate transaction according to the statute.
Also, in Mortgage Bankers Ass'n v. N.J. Real Estate Commission, 491 A.2d
1317 (N.J. Super. A.D. 1985), the court held that a statute authorizing the
Real Estate Ccranission to take disciplinary action against a broker who was
found guilty of collecting a cotmission as the broker in a transaction when at
same time representing either party in the transaction in a different
capacity, applies to multiparty transactions. The court reasoned that
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"considering the broad range of services which a broker is authorized to
perform by N.J.S.A. 45:15-3 and which can be perfconed in a single
transaction, we are persuaded that reading subsection (i) as limited to a 2party transaction would abrogate legislative intent as well as cannon sense."
To interpret the statute as the Fifth District Court has necessitates
reading language into the statute which is not there and would be contrary to
the express language and legislative intent. Such interpretation would
require an assumption that although there was only one piece of property
bought and sold, the number of buyers, regardless of hew they were related,
determines the number of transactions involved.

In this case that would nean

there were four separate transactions on one property. This interpretation is
erroneous and contrary to established case law and legislative intent. Case
law has held that a transaction can involve multiple parties. The transaction
involved in this case was the purchase of propertyfcyRespondents frcm Steven
Carter. Although there were multiple parties involved in the transaction,
they acted in concert and as one, purchasing one piece of property, therefore
there was only one transaction. This single transaction entitles the McBrides
to a total recovery of $10,000, not $23,000.

POINT II
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT ARBITRARILY ASSIGNED
CO-PETITIONERS ONE-FOURTH OF THE DAMAGES FOUND IN THE
JUDGMENT, WHEN THAT JUDGMENT FOUND THE PETITIONERS AS
INJURED BY CARTER, AND DID NOT DIFFERENTIATE, OR MAKE
CN AN INDIVIDUAL BASIS.

EACH OF THE POUR
UNDERLYDG
A GROUP WERE
A FINDING OF INJURY

There is no evidence that plaintiffs were injured individually by
Carter's actions. The judgment submitted as the basis for the petition
against the Recovery Fund irakes no distinction between the plaintiffs.
Instead, it refers to them in the aggregate and made findings of actual
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damges to then as a group. However, the district court, in applying the
Recovery Fund Act, arbitrarily awarded each person involved in the transaction
one-fourth of the actual damages of $23,000, or $5,750. This application of
the statute without using an underlying judgment which assigned harm to
individual plaintiffs would be inequitable and unmanageable. The court
literally reached back into the original judgment and interpreted it to suit
the claims in the petition against the Recovery Fund.

In this case, the

underlying action found injury to the McBrides as group and did not
distinguish damages on an individual basis. Therefore, to arbitrarily award
each individual a percentage of actual damages is not an equitable application
of the statute since it is contraiy to the literal language of the statute and
the interest of each McBrides was incapable of determination from the
judgment.

To allcw recovery on such a basis necessitates the court's

determination that each party was entitled to 25 percent of the actual
damages, when in fact there was no evidence to that effect before the court.
Further, by definition the underlying judgment must be final, and therefore
incapable of being altered fcy the subsequent action against the Recovery Fund.
That underlying action must stand on its cwn, and be considered complete
within the four-corners of the judgment. Any other holding would make cases
of this type unmanageable, since each such interpretation would involve the
Recovery Fund in more litigation, which was certainly not the legislature's
intent when it specifically required that the underlying judgment be final.
Therefore, the McBrides, whose a claim against the Recovery Fund was based on
a judgment which shews that they were injured as a group of co-purchasers of
property fran Carter, should only be entitled to recover as a group.
If the district court's interpretation of the statute were adopted,
additional interpretation problems would need to be addressed.
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Should the

District Court's reasoning be applied to the second half of the conjimctive
sentence, "No recovery from the fund may be more than $10,000 for a single
transaction and no more than $50,000 for any one licensee" disaster could
result.

If the district court's reasoning in this case were applied to the

second half of that sentence, recovery could be interpreted as extending to
$50,000 "per person"

per licensee or $50,000 per licensee per transaction.

The application of the District Court's interpretation of the Recovery Fund
Act would render the Recovery Fund bankrupt, and thereby frustrate the
purposes for which the fund was established.
The Recovery Fund is self-funded frcm monies received fran licensees who
are assessed fees every two years. At present, real estate brokers are
assessed $15 per year, and salesagents are assessed $10 per year. The amount
available in the Fund is determined by hew nany licensees renew their real
estate licenses. Currently, there are an average of 100 licensees per month
who do not rena^ their licenses, and therefore do not contribute to the
recovery fund, although the fund remains liable for payment on their behalf
for any conduct which occurred while they were licensed. This decline in
licensees has resulted in a fewer monies going into the Recovery Fund.
However, the number of claims against the Fund and monies paid out of the Fund
are increasing.

Consequently, the Fund is shrinking and if the District

Court's interpretation is adopted, the Fund could be wiped out.

Therefore,

the Fifth District Court's interpretation, which contravenes other courts
application of § 61-2a-5(l), should be rejected, and the statute interpreted
in light of its literal wording which limits recovery to $10,000 for a single
transaction. Thus, Respondents should only be entitled to a total recovery of
$10,000.

- 16 -

CONCLUSION

It is clear from the language in the Recovery Fund Act that recovery frcm
the fund is on a "per transaction" basis, regardless of the number of
claiitants involved in the transaction. To interpret the act so that each
claimant could potentially recover $10,000 would frustrate the purpose of the
fund, which is to allcw a measure of relief to as many injured parties as
possible, and, potentially bankrupt the fund, thereby denying any relief to
many having qualifying claims against defaulting real estate licensees.
Therefore, the Division of Real Estate prays the Court reverse the
Order of Judge Eves and rerand the case for the entry of an order in keeping
with the statutory limit of $10,000 per transaction set by the legislature.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/ day of January, 1989.

R. PAUL VAN DAM (#3312)
Attorney General of Utah

SHEIlX PAGE (#4898)^
Assistant AttorneyLGfeneral
Tax & Business Regulation Div.
130 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1019
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of the foregoing Appellant's Brief to the following:
John L. Miles
Wright & Miles
60 North 300 East
St. George, Utah 84770
postage prepaid, this

/

day of January, 1989.

APPENDIX A

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH

RL£&

DON W. MCBRIDE, et al,

0EC131988

Plaintiffs,

Clerk. Supremo Court. Utah

v.

ORDER FOR ENLARGEMENT
OF TIME TO FILE
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STEVEN R. CARTER,
Defendant.
DON W. MCBRIDE, et al,
Petitioners/Respondents,

Case No. 880365

v.
THE DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS
REGULATION OF THE STATE OF UTAH,
as Administrator of the Real
Estate Education, Research, and
Recovery Fund,
Respondent/Appellant.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, for the reasons set forth in Appellant's
Motion for Enlargement of Time and based upon the stipulation of the parties to
this appeal, that the time for filing Appellant's brief is enlarged thirty (30) days,
from December 9, 1988 to January 9, 1989. ,.;
DATED this

/ l

day of 6vk**id*4~~,

1988.

BY THE COURT:

V/<L)ft.6>

/ U T A H SUPREMECOURT JUSTICE

Approved as to form:
John L. Miles
Attorney for Petitioners/Respondents

APPENDIX B

WRIGHT 6 MILES
John L. Miles
Attorney for Plaintiffs
60 North 300 East
St. George, Utah 84770
Telephone: (801) 628-2612
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DON W. McBRIDE & YVONNE Z.
McBRIDE, husband and wife, and ]>
JAMES G. McBRIDE & PAULA S.
McBRIDE, husband and wife.
Plaintiffs,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
STEVEN R. CARTER; JANET C.
MASON; SRC INVESTMENT COMPANY, ]
A Utah Corporation; and AGUDO
INC., A Utah Corporation,
1

Civil No. 86-0646

Defendants.
Petition Directed To:
REAL ESTATE EDUCATION, RESEARCH,
AND RECOVERY FUND,
]

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for
hearing on July 12, 1988 on the plaintiffs1 petition for payment
from the "Real Estate Education, Research, And Recovery Fund",
One of the plaintiffs, Don W. McBridef appeared with plaintiffs'
attorney, John L. Miles, who presented oral argument in support
of the petition. Sheila Page, attorney for the Division of Real
Estate of the Department of Business Regulation of the State of
Utah ("Division") appeared on behalf of the Real Estate Recovery
Fund and presented argument in opposition to the payment of more
than $10,000,00 from the recovery fund.
The Court, having reviewed the petition and the file in
this matter, having considered the memorandum objecting to
plaintiffs* recovering more than $10,000.00 from the recovery
fund, and having considered the oral arguments presented by

counsel for both parties, and good cause appearing therefore,
hereby makes and enters its
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. That plaintiffs have filed a proper petition and
have met all conditions precedent and all conditions required by
law for recovery from the real estate recovery fund. Further,
that the Division, in its response to the petition, has
acknowledged that plaintiffs are entitled to receive $10,000.00
from the recovery fund. The Division contends that recovery is
limited to $10,000.00 because there was only one transaction
and that multiple claimaints harmed by one transaction are
limited to $10,000.00 and must share therein.
2. The Court finds that the applicable Utah statute
should be the statute in effect at the time plaintiffs filed
their petition for recovery from the real estate recovery fundf
and not the statute in effect at the time the original complaint
against the real estate licensee was filed or the statute in
effect at the time the final judgment was entered against the
real estate licensee.
3. The Court finds that plaintiffs sustained actual
damages of $23r000.00 which were included in the $34,026.31
judgment against the real estate licensee. The Court further
finds that none of the judgment has been collected.
4. The Court finds that the statute in effect when the
petition was filed on or about May 16f 1988 does not allow
recovery for punitive damages, attorney's fees, interest or Court
costs and that plaintiffs cannot recover more than $23,000.00
from the recovery fund.
5. The Court finds that the Utah Real Estate Recovery
Fund Act is not clear in reference to instances where there are
multiple claimants, but finds from the wording of the statute,
Section 61-2a-5 of the Utah Code, that references therein that "A
person may bring a claim. • ." and "If the person making a claim
. . ." and also ". • • the person making the claim . • ." are all
references to a single individual and that each individual who
has sustained actual damages may bring a claim against the
recovery fund with each claim being limited by the statute to
2

$10,000.00 for a single transaction.
6. The Court finds that each of the four individual
plaintiffs has suffered actual damages of $5,750.00 (being
one-fourth of the $23,000.00 actual damages included in the
judgment) and that each is entitled to receive $5,750.00 from the
real estate recovery fund.
7. The Court further finds that the statute is
remedial and intended to protect the public against loss
resulting from fraud, misrepresentation or deceit by real estate
licensees and should therefore be given a liberal construction to
promote that purpose.
Based upon the foregoing findings of Fact, the Court
makes the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. That the law in effect at the time the petition for
recovery was filed in May, 1988 is the applicable law governing
this case.
2. That each of the four individual plaintiffs is
entitled to recover $5,750.00 (being one-fourth of the $23,000.00
actual damages included in the judgment) from the real estate
recovery fund.
3. That an Order should issue directing payment of
$5,750.00 to each of the four plaintiffs, to-wit, Don W. McBride,
Yvonne Z. McBride, James G. McBride, and Paula S. McBride, said
payments to be made from the Real Estate Education, Research, and
Recovery Fund.
/
DATED this i/A ~ day of July, 1988.
BY THE COURT:

WRIGHT & MILES
John L. Miles
Attorney for Plaintiffs
60 North 300 East
St. George, Utah 84770
Telephone: (801) 628-2612
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DON W. McBRIDE & YVONNE Z.
McBRIDE, husband and wife, and
JAMES G. McBRIDE & PAULA S.
McBRIDE, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,

)
)

ORDER DIRECTING PAYMENT
FROM THE REAL ESTATE
EDUCATION, RESEARCH, AND
RECOVERY FUND

vs.
STEVEN R. CARTER; JANET C.
MASON; SRC INVESTMENT COMPANY, ]
A Utah Corporation; and AGUDO
INC., A Utah Corporation,
I

Civil No. 86-0646

Defendants.
Petition Directed To:
REAL ESTATE EDUCATION, RESEARCH,
AND RECOVERY FUND,
]

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for
hearing on July 12, 1988 on the plaintiffs1 petition for payment
from the "Real Estate Education, Research, And Recovery Fund".
One of the plaintiffs, Don W. McBride, appeared with plaintiffs'
attorney, John L. Miles, who presented oral argument in support
of the petition. Sheila Page, attorney for the Division of Real
Estate of the Department of Business Regulation of the State of
Utah ("Division") appeared on behalf of the Real Estate Recovery
Fund and presented argument in opposition to the payment of more
than $10,000.00 from the recovery fund.
The Court, having reviewed the petition and the file in
this matter, having considered the memorandum objecting to
plaintiffs* recovering more than $10,000.00 from the recovery
fund, and having considered the oral arguments presented by

counsel for both parties, and having previously made and entered
its findings of fact and conclusions of law,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Division of Real Estate
of the Department of Business Regulation of the State of Utah
is directed and ordered to pay from the Real Estate Education,
Research, and Recovery Fund the sum of $5,750,00 to each of the
four plaintiffs, namely, Don W. McBride, Yvonne Z. McBride, James
G. McBride, and Paula S. McBride, for a total payment of
$23,000.00, the aggregate amount of uncollected actual damages
included in the judgment and unpaid.
DATED this $(~
day of July, 1988.
BY THE COURT:

Philip Ev
istrict Couft Judge

APPENDIX C

DAVID L. WILKINSON (#3472)
Attorney General of Utah
STEPHEN G. SCHWENDIMAN (#2891)
Chief, Assistant Attorney General
SHEILA PAGE (#4898)
Assistant Attorney General
Tax & Business Regulation Division
130 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801)538-1019
oooooOooooo
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
oooooOooooo
DON W. MCBRIDE, et al,
Plaintiffs,

NOTICE OF APPEAL

v.
STEVEN R. CARTER,

Civil No. 86-0646

Defendant.
oooooOooooo
NOTICE is hereby given that the Division of Real Estate of the
Department of Business Regulation of the State of Utah ("Division"), by and
through counsel, Sheila Page, Assistant Attorney General, hereby appeals to the
Utah Court of Appeals from the Judgment rendered by the Honorable J. Philip
Eves in the above entitled matter, which Judgment was entered July 28, 1988.
The Division is an agency of state government and is exempted from
the filing of fees by Utah Code Ann. §§ 21-2-2, 21-7-2,1953, as amended. The
Division is also exempt from the requirement of posting a bond pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-27-12, 1953, as amended.

APPENDIX D

CHAPTER 2a
REAL ESTATE RECOVERY FUND
61-2a-l.

Citation.

This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Real Estate
Recovery Fund Act."
61-2a-2•

Purpose.

The purposes of this chapter are as follows:
(1) To establish a Real Estate Education, Research and
Recovery Fund that shall reimburse the public out of the fund
for damages incurred by defaulting real estate licensees up
to $10,000.
(2) To provide revenue for improving the real estate
profession through education and research with the goal of
making real estate salesmen more responsible to the public.
61-2a-3.

Education, Research and Recovery Fund.

There is created a segregated special fund to be known as the
Real Estate Education, Research, and Recovery Fund. At the
commencement of each fiscal year, $100,000 shall be available in
the fund for satisfying judgments rendered against persons
licensed under Chapter 2, Title 61.
61-2a-4.

Additional license fee - Purpose.

Every person who applies for or renews a real estate principal
broker or associate broker license shall pay, in addition to the
application or renewal fee, a reasonable fee determined by the
Division of Real Estate with the concurrence of the Real Estate
Commission of not in excess of $18. Every person who applies for
or renews a real estate sales agent license shall pay in addition
to the application or renewal fee a reasonable fee determined by
the division with the concurrence of the commission of not in
excess of $12. These additional fees shall be paid into the Real
Estate Education, Research, and Recovery Fund to be used for the
purposes of this chapter.
61-2a-5.

Notice to division - Judgment against real estate
licensee - Fraud, misrepresentation, or deceit Verified petition for order directing payment
from fund - Limitations and procedure.

(1) A person may bring a claim against the Real Estate
Education, Research, and Recovery Fund only if he provides
written notice to the Division of Real Estate at the time he
files an action against a real estate licensee alleging fraud,

misrepresentation, or deceit. Within 30 days of receipt of the
notice, the division shall have an unconditional right to
intervene in the action. If the person making a claim against
the fund obtains a final judgment in a court of competent
jurisdiction in this state against the licensee based upon fraud,
misrepresentation, or deceit in any real estate transaction, the
person making the claim may, upon termination of all proceedings
including appeals, file a verified petition in the court where
the judgment was entered for an order directing payment from the
Real Estate Education, Research, and Recovery Fund for the
uncollected actual damages included in the judgment and unpaid.
Recovery from the fund may not include punitive damages,
attorney's fees, interest, or court costs. No recovery from the
fund may be more than $10,000 for a single transaction and no
more than $50,000 for any one licensee.
(2) A copy of the petition shall be served upon the Division
of Real Estate of the Department of Business Regulation, and an
affidavit of the service shall be filed with the court.
(3) The court shall conduct a hearing on the petition within
30 days after service. The petitioner shall recover from the
fund only if he shows all of the following:
(a) He is not the spouse of the judgment debtor or the
personal representative of the spouse.
(b) He has complied with this chapter.
(c) He has obtained a final judgment in the manner
prescribed under this section, indicating the amount of the
judgment awarded.
(d) He has proved the amount still owing on the
judgment at the date of the petition.
(e) He has had a writ of execution issued upon the
judgment, and the officer executing the writ has made a
return showing that no property subject to execution in
satisfaction of the judgment could be found. If execution
is levied against the property of the judgment debtor, the
petitioner shall show that the amount realized was
insufficient to satisfy the judgment, and shall indicate the
amount realized and the balance remaining on the judgment
from the assets of the judgment debtor.
(4) If the petitioner satisfies the court that it is not
practicable for him to comply with one or more of the
requirements enumerated in Subsections (3)(e) and (f), the court
may waive those requirements.
61-2a-6.

Real Estate Division - Authority to act upon
receipt of petition.

(1) Upon receipt of a petition as required by § 61-2a-5, the
Real Estate Division may answer, initiate review proceedings of
its own, or appear in any proceeding in the name of the defendant
to the action or on behalf of the fund.
(2) The division may, subject to court approval, compromise a
claim based upon the application of a petitioner.

61-2a-7.

Court determination and order.

If the court determines that a claim should be levied against
that portion of the fund allocated for the purpose of carrying
out the provisions of this act, the court shall enter an order
directed to the division requiring payment from the fund of that
portion of the petitioner's judgment that is payable from the
fund pursuant to the provisions of and in accordance with the
limitations contained in § 61-2a-5.
61-2a-8.

Insufficient funds to satisfy judgments Procedure and interest.

If the money deposited in the fund and allotted for satisfying
judgments against licensees is insufficient to satisfy any
authorized claim for payment, the division shall, when sufficient
money has been deposited in the fund, satisfy the unpaid claims
in the order that they were originally filed, together with
accumulated interest at the rate of 8% per annum.
61-2a-9.

Division subrogated to judgment creditor Authority to revoke license.

If the division makes payment from the fund to a judgment
creditor, the division shall be subrogated to all the rights of
the judgment creditor for the amounts paid out of the fund and
any amount and interest recovered by the division shall be
deposited in the fund. The license of any real estate licensee
for whom payment from the fund is made under this chapter shall
be automatically revoked. The licensee may not apply for a new
license until the amount paid out on his account, plus interest
at a rate determined by the Division of Real Estate with the
concurrence of the commission, has been repaid in full. A
discharge in bankruptcy does not relieve a licensee from the
penalties and obligations of this section
61-2a-10.

Failure to comply with all provisions constitutes
a waiver.

The failure of any person to comply with the provisions of
this chapter shall constitute a waiver of any rights provided
under it.
61-2a-ll.

Director of department of business regulation Authority to take disciplinary action not limited.

Nothing contained in this chapter shall limit the authority of
the director of the Department of Business Regulation to take
disciplinary action against a licensee for a violation of any of
the provisions of Chapter 2 of Title 61, or of the rules and

regulations of the Real Estate Division. The repayment in full
of all obligations to the fund by any licensee does not nullify
or modify the effect of any other disciplinary proceeding brought
pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 2 of Title 61 or the rules
and regulations promulgated by the commission.
61-2a-12.

Moneys accumulated - Excess set aside - Purpose.

Any of the money accumulated in the Real Estate Education,
Research and Recovery Fund in excess of $100,000 shall be set
aside and segregated to be used by the Real Estate Division in
carrying out the advancement of education and research in the
field of real estate, including courses sponsored by the
division, offered by the division in conjunction with any
university or college in the state, or provided for by
contracting for a particular research project in the field of
real estate for the state.
68-3-12.

Rules of construction.

(1) In the construction of these statutes, the following
general rules shall be observed, unless such construction would
be inconsistent with the manifest intent of the Legislature or
repugnant to the context of the statute:
(a) The singular number includes the plural, and the plural
the singular.
(b) Words used in one gender comprehend the other.
(c) Words used in the present tense include the future.
68-3-11

Rules of construction as to words and phrases.

Words and phrases are to be construed according to the context
and the approved usage of the language; but technical words and
phrases, and such others as have acquired a peculiar and
appropriate meaning in law, or are defined by statute, are to be
construed according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning or
definition.

